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Abstract
This study investigates the potential simultaneous relationships among lever-
age, debt maturity and cash holdings and how these jointly affect financial pol-
icy and firms' investment activities in developing countries of Thailand,
Indonesia and Singapore during the period 2006–2015. Using the two-step sys-
tem GMM estimator, our results show that high-growth firms not only shorten
debt maturity to reduce the underinvestment incentive, but also decrease
leverage to reduce liquidity risk. We find evidence that the level of cash hold-
ings is a key determinant of leverage in all countries and that debt policy and
growth opportunities affect the investment decision of firms in Thailand and
Singapore whereas cash policy is more important in Indonesia. These findings
have significant implications for investment decisions in these economies.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Modern corporate finance recognizes that, in the pres-
ence of market imperfections, firm financial and invest-
ment policies are related and depend on the firm's
growth prospect. For instance, in the presence of infor-
mation asymmetry between shareholders and debt-
holders, Myers (1977) shows that managers of leveraged
firms with growth opportunities may not undertake posi-
tive NPV if the payoff of such projects benefit only the
debtholders, leading to an underinvestment problem. On
the other hand, Jensen and Meckling (1973) argue that
managers of firms with low growth opportunities and
free cash flows are more prone to make their firms grow
beyond an optimal size, leading to an overinvestment
problem. Dang (2011) advocates the use of more leverage
to act as a disciplining mechanism which in turn helps to
reduce the overinvestment problem. Thus, in the pres-
ence of information asymmetry and agency conflicts, cor-
porate financial policies, such as the level of the firm
cash holdings, the level of debt as well as the maturity
structure of debt, are jointly determined, and these finan-
cial policies are interrelated with the firm corporate
investment policy.
As noted above, corporate financial policy has many
key elements, including the level of debt, the maturity
structure of debt, and the level of cash holdings. Early
research on corporate financial policy has explained a sin-
gle element of financial policy at a time and treated each
financial policy choice as independent of the others.1 How-
ever, in practice, financial policy choices are simulta-
neously determined. Other recent studies have mainly
concentrated on the simultaneous determination of lever-
age and debt maturity, the twin dimensions of capital
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structure (Barclay, Marx, & Smith, 2003; Billett, King, &
Mauer, 2007; Dang, 2011; Elyasiani, Guo, & Tang, 2002;
Johnson, 2003), but less attention has been devoted to the
interdependence of these financial policy choices and cor-
porate cash holdings. Acharya, Almeida, and
Campello (2007) state that ignoring simultaneity between
cash and debt policies may lead to spurious inferences
because while cash reserves of firms are determined by
their debt (proceeds from debt issuances) and cash flow
(saving cash out of cash flow), changes in their leverage
also accounts for changes in their cash balances and cash
flow. Similarly, Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell (2014) point
out that when firms make decisions on debt maturity
structure and cash holdings, these firms trade off the bene-
fits of shorter debt maturity against increased refinancing
risk and also simultaneously consider how larger cash
reserves can help reduce the increased refinancing risk.
Thus, cash holding represents an important channel in
mitigating the negative effect of policy uncertainty on firm
real economic activities. Duong, Nguyen, and Rhee (2020)
find that increase in cash holdings is not attributed to a
reduction in firm investments but is more pronounced for
financially constrained firms or those with larger exposure
to policy uncertainty. Thus, holding more cash in the pres-
ence of policy uncertainty reduces the side effect of such
policy on capital investment and firm innovation outputs.
As such, the purpose of this article is to investigate the
simultaneous inter-relationship between leverage, debt
maturity and cash holdings in the light of the set of growth
opportunities that are available to a firm, and also how
these financial policies affect firm investment decision.
To investigate the abovementioned interrelationship,
we select firms from three growing Southeast Asian tiger
economies (i.e., Singapore) and tiger cub economies
(i.e., Indonesia and Thailand) to test our hypotheses
which is a significant departure from the vast majority of
previous studies that use the western economies for their
empirical samples. The Asian tiger economies exceeded
7% growth per year during the latter part of the 20th cen-
tury, and successfully transformed into highly advanced,
high-income economies. The Tiger Cub Economies are
low-to-middle-income with an abundant work force, high
rates of investment and rapid economic growth, similar
to early versions of the Four Asian Tigers.
Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand are some of the
most optimistic countries in terms of consumer confidence
and not surprisingly were able to attract the top three
direct investment inflows in the region in 2014. Thailand,
Indonesia and Singapore are the main economies in the
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). The AEC market is
considered a high growth environment offering a huge
potential market place for investors. Ten member nations
of the AEC comprise a population of 625 million and have
a combined GDP of $2.8 trillion, of which $1.5 trillion is
contributed by Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore. Our
study investigates the simultaneous inter-relationship
between leverage, debt maturity and cash flow in high
growth environments where firms are exposed to higher
levels of information asymmetry and agency costs. There-
fore, we depart from previous studies in this area which
are based on firms in the United States and other devel-
oped countries by using Thailand, Indonesia and Singa-
pore that offer a high growth environment compared to
US and markets of other developed countries as the test
bed of our hypothesis. This is important in at least two
aspects. Firstly, from a practical standpoint the three cho-
sen countries (i.e., Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore) are
high impact economies and a study of dynamics that gov-
ern firms in these economies is of critical importance. Sec-
ondly, as previously explained, past studies differ in terms
of market sentiment and other characteristics and have
focused on more mature developed economies such as US
and UK. Thus, from a theoretical stand point, and by
focusing on Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore, we are
effectively investigating the impact of Southeast Asian
growth states on the dynamics of the simultaneous interre-
lationship between leverage, debt maturity and cash hold-
ings in the light of the set of growth opportunities that are
available to a firm.
The paper adds to the literature by investigating the
interaction between three corporate financial policies and
investment decisions in light of the firm's growth prospect.
In so doing, we model the simultaneous behaviour of, debt
maturity, and corporate cash holdings. This extended
model allows further investigation of how firms simulta-
neously determine their leverage, debt maturity and cash
holdings on one hand; and how this simultaneous choice
can affect their investment on the other hand. As
explained above, we choose a high growth environment to
test our assumptions as firms in these environments have
higher levels of information asymmetry and agency costs.
We make the following contributions to the literature
based our empirical findings. First, the results highlight
the importance of considering the simultaneity of lever-
age, debt maturity, and cash holdings, suggesting that
future research should not ignore this endogeneity bias
as it may lead to flawed conclusions. Second, we find sup-
port for both the underinvestment hypothesis and liquid-
ity risk theory. Liquidity risk can be exasperated if the
level of cash holding does not meet the current liabilities
of the business. High-growth firms do not only shorten
debt maturity to reduce the liquidity risk, but also
decrease leverage to mitigate the underinvestment incen-
tive. Third, we find that cash holdings significantly affect
the decision on leverage in these countries which indi-
cates that firms value financial flexibility in high growth
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environments. However, we do not find evidence that
cash holdings affect debt maturity.
Our findings have implications to capital market par-
ticipants and regulatory policy makers. As our results
show that high growth firms in Singapore, Indonesia and
Thailand have a tendency to reduce liquidity risk by
shortening the debt maturity structure and to reduce
bankruptcy risk by decreasing leverage, these actions
would have a bearing on the overall risk profile of an
individual firm and hence on the its expected return.
Thus, from an investor standpoint in the fund allocation
decision our results aid towards the formulation of effec-
tive benchmarks that can assist in identifying abnormal
return opportunities. Furthermore, from a regulatory
standpoint, as our work sheds insight on the dynamics of
how leverage, debt maturity, and cash holdings simulta-
neously effect each other and the firm's investment policy
our findings can assist towards the better understanding
of the economy wide systematic risks at a macro level
and hence shape regulatory policy aimed at reducing the
macroeconomic risks in these high growth environments.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows:
Section 2 provides the literature review and the develop-
ment of the hypotheses, Section 3 is the data description
and empirical models; Sections 4 is results and discussion
of findings. Section 5 is the conclusion.
2 | REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
In the presence of market imperfections such as informa-
tion asymmetries and agency conflicts, prior studies have
showed that financial as well as investment decisions
depend largely on the firm's growth prospect. For
instance, Myers (1977) argues that when a firm has risky
debt, managers may forgo positive-NPV projects as the
payoffs of the projects partially accrue to debtholders,
resulting in an underinvestment problem. Myers reveals
that firms with growth opportunities are more prone to
the underinvestment problem. As such, rational lenders
anticipate conflicts and hence charge a higher interest
rate to fund these investments. Myers proposed two pos-
sible strategies to eliminate the underinvestment prob-
lem: (a) lowering the level of leverage or (b) increasing
the level of short term debt. The motivation behind the
use of short term debt is to allow firms to undertake all
positive NPV projects as the short term debt would
mature before the completion of the project.
The above two strategies, advocated by Myers, suggest
that short-term debt and leverage act as strategic substi-
tutes to mitigate the underinvestment problem. The sub-
stitution effect suggests that firms using short term debt
to resolve agency conflict of underinvestment problem
have less incentive to reduce leverage. In a similar vein,
firms that lower their leverage level to control for the
underinvestment problem and bankruptcy will be less
inclined towards using short term debt. Lambrecht and
Pawlina (2013) argue that tangibility and leverage are
negatively related when debt is over collateralized. This
allows firms with higher tangibility to issue more debt
without increasing expected bankruptcy costs. They
developed a theory that where firms adopt a net debt tar-
get which acts as a balancing factor between shareholders
and managers. Joshi (2019) asserts that the level of cash
holding by firms is influenced by the level of their
growth. For example, high-growth firms hold more cash
to facilitate growth opportunities, capital expenditure
planning and cost of debt financing. However, low-
growth firms tend to hold more net debt rather than high
cash. Accordingly, based on the underinvestment hypoth-
esis we offer the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a. There is a negative relationship between
growth opportunities and leverage.
Hypothesis 1b. There is a positive relationship between
growth opportunities and short term debt.
One possible drawback with the use of short term debt
to resolve the underinvestment problem is that it exposes
firms to additional costs stemming from refinancing risk.
According to Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), changes
in market conditions or capital market imperfections can
lead to higher borrowing costs. Firms with short term debt
may find it difficult to roll over the outstanding debt if the
lenders refuse refinancing (Diamond, 1991, 1993), leading
to liquidation or sale of important firm assets (Harford
et al., 2014; Lambrecht & Pawlina, 2013). The refinancing
risk argument suggests that debt maturity and leverage act
as a complement to each other. As such it could be argued
that the use of short term debt can affect the firm in two
ways. First, it can mitigate the underinvestment problem.
Second, it can increase the refinancing risk. In sum, the
underinvestment argument predicts a negative relationship
between debt maturity structure and leverage. However,
the refinancing risk hypothesis predicts a positive relation-
ship. This suggests that firm's debt policy depends upon
the tradeoff between underinvestment cost and refinancing
risk argument. As such we offer the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. There is a significant relationship between
short term debt and leverage.
According to Harford et al. (2014), firms that hold
cash reserves are able to mitigate the refinancing risk.
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The cash reserves allow firms to take up their growth
opportunities, prevent firms from selling key assets and
reduce the probability of firm bankruptcy. Indeed,
Sun (2014) finds that firms that expect difficulties in
obtaining future financing for future investments hold
cash to hedge uncertain future financing conditions,
implying a positive relationship between cash holdings
and short debt maturity. Using the resource dependence
theory, Li, Fung, Fung, and Qiao (2020) show that cash
holding is negatively related to network centrality and
structural holes of directorate interlocks. They argue that
the directorate interlocks facilitate firms to have bank
loans that substitute for cash holdings. Their result
underscores the importance of the resource-based per-
spective on cash holding, and supports the argument that
firms that have difficulty raising external funding have to
hold more cash for precautionary motives. This, holding
less cash can also be a business strategy for some firms.
Yang and Cao (2019) highlight that corporate decisions
such as payouts, cash holdings, investment, external
financing, and even risk management strategies are
highly dependent on the manager's ‘time-inconsistent
preferences’. They argue that a time-inconsistent man-
ager tends to pay out cash to shareholders earlier by low-
ering the dividend payment (see also Nnadi, Sailesh
Tanna, & Kabel, 2013), which causes the firm to hold less
cash reserves and raise less equity. On the other hand,
Harford et al. (2014) argue that large cash reserves may
allow firms to rely on shorter debt maturity, implying a
negative relationship between debt maturity and cash
holdings. Thus, our third hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 3. There is a significant relationship between
short term debt and cash holdings.
The relationship between growth opportunities and
cash holdings has also attracted a number of researchers.
For instance, Myers and Majluf (1984) find that informa-
tion asymmetry between corporate insiders and outside
investors is more severe for firms with growth opportuni-
ties. This greater asymmetric information leads to a
higher cost of financing particularly for firms. Potì,
Pattitoni, and Petracci (2020) explore the role precaution-
ary motives in cash holding in private firms. They find
evidence that the cash holdings to total assets is nega-
tively related to the skewness of the distribution of the
firm returns, as well as to the correlation between cash
flows and investment in private firms. This implies that
insiders will reduce the riskiness of their business if
unable to attain the desired level of cash holdings, and in
economies affected by cash shortages, entrepreneurs will
be more cautious (Mortal, Nanda, & Reisel, 2020). In
addition, firms with growth opportunities face higher
financial distress costs and therefore high propensity to
hold more cash (Joshi, 2019). Myers (1984) states that
financial distress costs depend not only on the probability
of default, but also on the value lost in bankruptcy.
Growth opportunities, which are intangible in nature
and part of the firms' value, are more likely to lose their
value in financial distress. The study by Toledo and
Marco (2010) on the level of cash holding in Europe
shows that the most relevant factors in determining
risk includes the level of cash holding, and the number
of shareholders in relation to the size of the fund. This
implies that the level of cash holding even in developed
economies is a significant factor in assessing the degree
of risk of a business. Marwick, Hasan, and Luo (2020)
reveal that organization's capital is related to the level
of its cash holding, and firms with high level of organi-
sation capital hold relatively more cash. The study
indicates that the effect of organisation capital on cor-
porate cash holdings is stronger for firms experiencing
high level of financing constraint and cash flow risk.
As a result, firms with growth opportunities are more
likely to accumulate cash to avoid costly external
financing and financial distress costs. Therefore, a pos-
itive relationship between growth opportunities and
cash holdings is expected as expressed in our fourth
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4. There is a positive relationship between
growth opportunities and cash holdings.
According to the refinancing risk argument discussed
above, high level of leverage can lead to financial distress.
Therefore, it can be argued that firms with leverage hold
cash reserves to decrease their financial distress risk,
suggesting that a positive relationship may exist between
leverage and cash holding. Indeed, Ozkan and
Ozkan (2004) find that firms with leverage have high
probability of financial distress. However, an inverse rela-
tionship between cash holdings and leverage can also be
observed. For instance, according to the free cash flow
hypothesis developed by Jensen (1986), large level of cash
holdings may lead managers to undertake unprofitable or
overly risky projects to realize their own interests rather
than shareholders' interests, leading to an overinvestment
problem. In such a setting, Jensen and Stulz contend that
leverage could act as a monitoring mechanism,
suggesting that firms can mitigate the overinvestment
problem by increasing leverage to prevent managers from
hoarding cash. Bhuiyan and Hooks (2019) identify poor
corporate governance as one determinant of cash hold-
ings. They find evidence that firms with higher cash
holdings engage in overinvestment and such behaviour is
more pronounced when problem directors are on the
4 NNADI ET AL.
board. In light of the conflicting effect of leverage on cash
holdings, we offer the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5. There is a significant relationship between
leverage and cash holdings.
The underinvestment and overinvestment arguments
mentioned above provide interesting empirical implica-
tions for the interrelationship between corporate finan-
cial policies (leverage, debt maturity and cash holdings)
and firm investment. According to the underinvestment
argument, lowering the level of leverage and/or increas-
ing the level of short term debt allow firms to exercise
their growth opportunities. Joshi (2019) observes that
debt appears to be most important for low-growth firms,
followed by high-growth firms and financially-
constrained firms. This suggests that this debt strategy
allows for more investments. As pointed out by
Dang (2011), lowering the level of leverage and/or
increasing the level of short term debt are more likely to
magnify the positive effect of growth opportunities on
investment. As such we propose the following
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6. There is a positive relationship between
growth opportunities and firm investment.
Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) find that issuing debt
is used as a protection mechanism against over-
investment. Debt disciplines firms and force them to pay
out cash as interest and principal, suggesting that debt
servicing reduces the potential of investing in poor
investment projects (Aivazian et al., 2005b). Hence, the
overinvestment hypothesis suggests a negative relation-
ship between debt and firm investment. Hence, our sev-
enth hypothesis states:
Hypothesis 7. Leverage and debt maturity have signifi-
cant negative impact on firm investment.
Empirical research finds that firms with growth
opportunities can reduce the underinvestment problem
by holdings cash as these firms tend to face information
asymmetry problems, which can lead to the high cost of
external financing (Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999).
Harford et al. (2014) also find that firms with refinancing
risk can mitigate the underinvestment problem by hold-
ings cash reserves. This implies that cash reserves can
reduce refinancing risk, preventing the firms to forgo
valuable growth opportunities. As a result, cash holdings
are expected to positively affect firm investment, and
therefore our eighth hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 8. Cash holdings have a positive impact on
firm investment.
3 | DATA DESCRIPTION AND
EMPIRICAL MODELS
The sample for this study is an unbalanced panel of pub-
licly traded firms in Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore
that are available from the Datastream2 database over the
period of 2006 to 2015. The study period starts from the
year 2006 due to the availability of the historical yield
data of government bonds and treasury bills of the stud-
ied countries. The accounting data of these firms are
obtained from the Worldscope database.2 See Table A1 for
the empirical definition of the variables in this study. To
calculate total assets in constant prices, we also collected
the historical data of Consumer Price Index (CPI). The
initial sample excludes firms in the financial and utility
sectors as those firms have different regulatory account-
ing standards and unique capital structure characteris-
tics. Consequently, the final samples include 251 Thai,
206 Indonesian and 320 Singaporean firms. To reduce the
impact of outliers, we winsorise all firm-level variables at
1st and 99th percentiles.
To examine the inter-relationship between leverage,
debt maturity and cash holdings in the light of the set of
growth opportunities that are available to a firm, and also
how these financial policies affect firm investment deci-
sion, we augment Dang' (2011) partial adjustment frame-
work3 by introducing a cash holding equation. In
particular, we consider the following dynamic equations.
LEV i, t = α0 + δLEVLEV i, t−1 + α1MAT i, t + α2CASH i, t





+ νi + μi, t
ð1Þ
MAT i, t = α0 + δMATMAT i, t−1 + α1LEV i, t + α2CASH i, t





i, t + νi + μi, t
ð2Þ
CASH i, t = α0 + δCASHCASH i, t−1 + α1LEV i, t + α2MAT i, t




i, t + νi + μi, t
ð3Þ
Where LEVi,t is market leverage of a firm i in the end
of period t, measured by total debt divided by the market
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value of equity plus total liabilities. MATi,t is debt matu-
rity, measured by the ratio of long-term debt that matures
after 1 year to total debt. CASHi,t is corporate cash hold-
ings, defined as the ratio of cash and short-term invest-
ments to total assets. GTHi,t is growth opportunities,
defined by the market value of equity plus book value of
total liabilities, all divided by total assets. XLEVi,t are set of
control variables (see Appendix A1). νi represents the
time-invariant unobservable individual effects. μi,t is the
error term.
The growth interaction terms are included in the
equations. For instance, in Equation (1) the interaction
term GTHxMATi,t, is included to test whether short debt
maturity influences the hypothesized negative relation-
ship between leverage and growth opportunities. As the
net impact of growth opportunities on leverage is esti-
mated by ∂LEV/∂GTH = α3 + α4MAT, a shorter debt
maturity will decrease the negative impact of growth
opportunities on leverage if the coefficient of this interac-
tion term, α4, is negative (Dang, 2011).
To assess the effect of financial policies on firm
investment, we have also considered the below invest-
ment equation.
INV i, t = α0 + δINV INV i, t−1 + α1LEV i, t−1 + α2MAT i, t−1
+ α3CASH i, t−1 + α4GTH i, t−1 + α5GTH × LEV i, t−1
+ α6GTH ×MAT i, t−1 + α7CF i, t−1 + νi + μi, t
ð4Þ
Where INVi,t is firm investment, measured by capital
expenditures less depreciation, all divided by lagged net
property, plant and equipment. CFi,t is cash flow, mea-
sured by EBITDA plus depreciation, all divided by total
assets.
It is generally argued that endogeneity can lead to
bias and inconsistent results. There are two possible cau-
ses of endogeneity with our empirical design: reverse cau-
sality (simultaneity) and the dynamic setting of the
equations (i.e., including lagged dependent variables).
For the simultaneity (among leverage, debt maturity and
cash holdings) issue, it could be argued the decision to
hold cash depends on the borrowing capacity of the firm,
and similarly the decision to borrow depends on the level
of cash held by the firm. Similarly, allowing the lagged
dependent variables used in the above equations to be
correlated with unobserved heterogeneity create an endo-
geneity bias. To address this problem, the difference
GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991)
is used. The difference GMM estimation involves first-
differencing the dynamic equations to remove the indi-
vidual effects and utilizing the lagged values in levels of
the dependent variables and of endogenous variables as
instruments for the first-differenced lagged dependent
variables and the first- differenced endogenous variables.
The two-step system GMM estimator with robust stan-
dard errors is the most suitable estimator for the model
in this study. However, to facilitate comparison with pre-
vious studies done on the single-equation we also employ
the pooled OLS estimator and the FE (within) estimator
to estimate the models without addressing endogeneity.
This exercise will also highlight the issues of ignoring the
endogeneity problem in our context. Moreover, the two-
equation system that simultaneously considers only
leverage and debt maturity is also estimated in order to
compare the results with the three-equation system that
accounts for the endogeneity among leverage, debt matu-
rity and cash holdings.
4 | RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF
FINDINGS
4.1 | Summary statistics
Table 1 provides the summary of the unbalanced panel
data for each country. Table 2 provides the summary of
descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of the var-
iables for each country are reported in Tables 3–5
respectively.
Table 2 shows that on average, firms in Thailand and
Indonesia are more levered than those in Singapore. The
mean (median) leverage of Thai and Indonesian firm is
0.283 (0.261) and 0.290 (0.254) respectively, while that of
Singaporean firms is 0.243 (0.212). These statistics are
higher than those documented in Johnson (2003) for the
U.S. firms and Dang (2011) for the UK firms.4 As for debt
TABLE 1 Structure of unbalanced panel data. The table
displays the number of firm-year observations for each country for
a particular year
Year Thailand Indonesia Singapore
2006 215 150 234
2007 225 159 263
2008 235 174 279
2009 244 186 290
2010 249 194 299
2011 251 206 320
2012 251 206 320
2013 251 206 319
2014 251 205 316
2015 251 200 306
Total 2,423 1,886 2,946
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TABLE 2 Summary statistics of variables
Variable Mean SD Minimum Median Maximum
Panel A: Thailand
Leverage 0.283 0.191 0.001 0.261 0.735
Debt maturity 0.404 0.314 0.000 0.389 0.994
Cash holdings 0.073 0.083 0.001 0.044 0.413
Firm investment 0.082 0.253 −0.305 0.014 1.601
Growth opportunities 1.284 0.726 0.480 1.072 4.705
Tangibility 0.383 0.238 0.008 0.380 0.916
Profitability 0.046 0.084 −0.280 0.048 0.272
Non-debt tax shields 0.040 0.029 0.001 0.035 0.160
Size 15.343 1.441 12.788 15.118 19.370
Asset maturity structure 14.976 16.055 1.650 10.347 105.948
Earnings volatility 0.048 0.048 0.004 0.034 0.297
Firm quality 0.022 0.215 −0.613 0.003 1.179
Term structure (%) 1.438 0.685 0.550 1.220 2.670
Effective tax rate 0.170 0.158 −0.024 0.176 0.840
Net working capital 0.063 0.225 −0.528 0.035 0.740
CAPEX 0.053 0.055 0.000 0.036 0.255
Dividend dummy 0.746 0.436 0.000 1.000 1.000
Net debt issuance 0.001 0.065 −0.217 −0.002 0.217
Cash flow 0.112 0.095 −0.230 0.107 0.405
Panel B: Indonesia
Leverage 0.290 0.209 0.002 0.254 0.869
Debt maturity 0.500 0.350 0.000 0.528 1.000
Cash holdings 0.101 0.095 0.002 0.069 0.398
Firm investment 0.111 0.263 −0.263 0.033 1.511
Growth opportunities 1.351 0.825 0.375 1.048 4.892
Tangibility 0.410 0.232 0.013 0.390 0.917
Profitability 0.068 0.081 −0.185 0.063 0.338
Non-debt tax shields 0.038 0.030 0.001 0.033 0.162
Size 21.001 1.605 17.555 20.995 24.545
Asset maturity structure 23.737 47.944 1.904 11.508 351.544
Earnings volatility 0.053 0.059 0.002 0.036 0.393
Firm quality 0.026 0.344 −1.492 0.005 1.988
Term structure 2.061 1.453 −1.313 2.041 4.535
Effective tax rate 0.201 0.504 −2.774 0.253 1.996
Net working capital 0.024 0.241 −1.255 0.029 0.539
CAPEX 0.058 0.062 0.000 0.037 0.309
Dividend dummy 0.492 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000
Net debt issuance 0.007 0.078 −0.284 0.000 0.296
Cash flow 0.114 0.095 −0.173 0.106 0.448
Panel C: Singapore
Leverage 0.243 0.176 0.001 0.212 0.697
Debt maturity 0.390 0.319 0.000 0.359 1.000
(Continues)
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maturity (the proportion of long-term debt), the average
ratio in Thailand (0.404) is similar to that in Singapore
(0.390), while it is highest in Indonesia (0.500),
suggesting that Indonesian firms use less short-term debt
than Thai and Singaporean firms. However, these statis-
tics are still lower than that in the UK (0.538) reported by
Dang (2011). The mean for cash holdings is highest in
Singapore (0.166), while it is lowest in Thailand (0.073).
Similar to Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) and Brick
and Liao (2016) for the U.S. firms, Indonesian firms have
the average cash holdings ratio of 0.101. The average firm
investment in Thailand is 0.082, which is equal to that in
Dang (2011) for the UK firms. However, the average ratio
in Indonesia and Singapore is higher at 0.111 and 0.123
respectively. As for growth opportunities, the results
show that all three countries have high growth opportu-
nities. The mean for growth opportunities is highest in
Indonesia (1.351), followed by Thailand (1.284) and then
Singapore (1.178). Nevertheless, the results for growth
opportunities do not appear to be consistent with those
for firm investment. According to Jensen (1986), firms
with high growth opportunities are usually active in
investment. However, in this study, Singapore firms that
have the lowest growth opportunities have the highest
ratio of firm investment. This suggests that there are
other factors that affect firm investment. The differences
in other variables also imply variations in the corporate
financial practices in these countries.
Correlation matrices in Table 3 show that consistent
with liquidity risk theory, leverage is weakly positively
correlated to debt maturity in all countries (0.040–0.095).
There is a moderate negative correlation between cash
holdings and leverage in all countries (−0.367 to −0.429).
While cash holdings are weakly positively correlated to
debt maturity in Thailand and Indonesia (0.080–0.101),
cash holdings and debt maturity are weakly negatively
correlated in Singapore (−0.026). A negative correlation
between growth opportunities and leverage in all coun-
tries (−0.321 to −0.470) is supported by the underinvest-
ment and overinvestment hypotheses that high-growth
firms decrease leverage to reduce the underinvestment
incentive, whereas low-growth firms increase leverage to
control the overinvestment incentive. However, a positive
correlation between growth opportunities and debt matu-
rity in all countries (0.045–0.117) contradicts the underin-
vestment and overinvestment hypotheses. Consistent
TABLE 2 (Continued)
Variable Mean SD Minimum Median Maximum
Cash holdings 0.166 0.120 0.008 0.137 0.589
Firm investment 0.123 0.408 −0.291 0.011 2.781
Growth opportunities 1.178 0.751 0.447 0.949 5.305
Tangibility 0.270 0.204 0.003 0.231 0.819
Profitability 0.025 0.102 −0.532 0.035 0.230
Non-debt tax shields 0.030 0.026 0.000 0.023 0.126
Size 12.283 1.658 9.154 12.013 16.940
Asset maturity structure 20.810 53.929 1.367 8.950 441.702
Earnings volatility 0.064 0.082 0.003 0.037 0.526
Firm quality 0.033 0.329 −1.064 0.002 1.714
Term structure 1.339 0.735 0.010 1.310 2.290
Effective tax rate 0.139 0.315 −1.373 0.153 1.533
Net working capital 0.051 0.192 −0.671 0.049 0.530
CAPEX 0.046 0.058 0.000 0.024 0.311
Dividend dummy 0.665 0.472 0.000 1.000 1.000
Net debt issuance 0.008 0.080 −0.258 −0.001 0.289
Cash flow 0.070 0.124 −0.632 0.081 0.370
Note: The variable definitions and measurements are in the Appendix. CAPEX is measured by capital expenditures divided by total assets. Dividend dummy is
1 if a firm paid a common dividend in a given year, 0 otherwise. Net debt issuance is measured by long-term borrowings minus long-term debt reduction, all
divided by total assets. Cash flow is measured by EBITDA divided by total assets. To mitigate the impact of outliers, all firm-level variables are winsorised at 1st
and 99th percentiles. As for Singapore, term structure is the difference between the yields of 10-year government bonds and those of 1-year treasury bills since
their final 3-month and 6-month treasury bills had been discontinued since 2013, and the yields of 1-year treasury bills are almost identical to those of 3-month
treasury bills, as shown in Table A2.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































10 NNADI ET AL.
with trade-off theory, growth opportunities and cash
holdings are positively correlated in all countries
(0.183–0.266). In line with the financial flexibility theory
firms with higher growth tend to accumulate more cash
to avoid forgoing valuable investments or expensive
external financing. In Thailand and Indonesia, firm
investment is negatively correlated with leverage but pos-
itively correlated with debt maturity, cash holdings and
growth opportunities. However, firm investment is posi-
tively correlated with leverage, debt maturity and growth
opportunities but negatively correlated with cash hold-
ings in Singapore.
Furthermore, the overall results show that the corre-
lations between variables in all countries are not strong
(less than −0.70 or more than 0.70), except for a strong
correlation between cash flow and profitability
(0.787–0.818). Nonetheless, cash flow and profitability
are not independent variables used in the same regres-
sion. Consequently, there is no multicollinearity5 prob-
lem in this study.
4.2 | Empirical results
4.2.1 | Leverage equation
Table 4 is the result of the leverage model and shows that
debt maturity (the proportion of long-term debt) has a
significant and positive effect on leverage in all countries
with the exception of Indonesia, which reports the





















Debt maturityt + 0.0829
*** 0.0615* 0.0162 0.0534 0.0893*** 0.0585***
(Prop. long) (3.89) (1.79) (0.66) (1.58) (5.37) (2.45)
Cash holdingst − −0.7299
***
−0.3287*** −0.5508*** −0.2521*** −0.5474*** −0.3232***
(−21.56) (−5.62) (−11.48) (−3.75) (−24.00) (−7.60)



























Tangibilityt + 0.0139 0.0447 0.0214 −0.0085 0.0190 0.0838
***
(0.88) (1.16) (0.90) (−0.16) (1.00) (2.58)
Profitabilityt − −0.3702
***
−0.4137*** −0.4965*** −0.3693*** −0.2359*** −0.2511***
(−8.93) (−7.61) (−7.40) (−4.49) (−7.36) (−5.81)














*** 0.0735*** 0.0151*** 0.0414** 0.0112*** 0.0644***
(7.53) (6.33) (4.85) (2.96) (5.77) (7.04)
Constant 0.1809*** −0.7286*** 0.0875 −0.5016* 0.2498*** −0.4849***
(5.21) (−3.92) (1.32) (−1.69) (10.01) (−4.14)
Observations 2,423 2,423 1,886 1,886 2,946 2,946
R2 0.3695 0.3508 0.3012 0.2368 0.3023 0.2707
Note: The dependent variable is leverage, measured by total debt divided by the market value of equity plus total liabilities. Debt maturity is measured by long-
term debt that matures after 1 year divided by total debt. Cash holdings are the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets. Growth opportunities are
measured by market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities, all divided by total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to
total assets. Profitability is the ratio of operating income to total assets. Non-debt tax shield is the ratio of depreciation and amortisation to total assets. Size is the
natural logarithm of total assets in 2006 price. t-Statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1%
levels, respectively.
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insignificant effect of debt maturity. The positively sig-
nificant relationship between leverage and debt matu-
rity is consistent with Elyasiani et al. (2002) for the
U.S. firms and the prediction of liquidity risk theory.
Using more short-term debt (a lower proportion of
long-term debt) increases liquidity risk. Firms there-
fore simultaneously lower leverage to help reduce the
increasing risk. In other words, leverage and debt
maturity are strategic complements to reduce
liquidity risk.
Consistent with Loncan and Caldeira (2014), the coef-
ficient on the cash holdings variable for all countries is
significant and negative at the 1% significance level,
suggesting that leverage decreases with cash holdings.
According to pecking order theory, firms prefer internal
financing (retained earnings and cash holdings) to exter-
nal financing (equity or debt). Under this theory, when
investments exceed retained earnings, firms first use the
accumulated cash reserves and then issue debt if the
accumulated cash is not sufficient. In all countries,
growth opportunities have a significant and negative
impact on leverage at the 1% significance level. This pro-
vides a strong support for Myers' (1977) underinvestment
hypothesis that firms with high growth opportunities
control their underinvestment incentive by lowering
leverage. This finding is in line with Rajan and
Zingales (1995), Deesomsak, Paudyal, and Pescetto (2004)
and Frank and Goyal (2009).
TABLE 5 Determinants of debt maturity















** 0.1038 0.1303* 0.0822 0.1287** 0.0652
(2.37) (0.99) (1.79) (0.63) (2.02) (0.76)
Cash holdingst +/− 0.3518
*** 0.2158* 0.2081** 0.1515 0.1703*** 0.1309*
(3.98) (1.91) (2.36) (1.20) (3.13) (1.73)






































Earnings volatilityt − −0.0056 −0.0719 0.3506
** 0.1318 0.1910** 0.1873*
(−0.04) (−0.46) (2.42) (0.70) (2.38) (1.78)
Firm qualityt − −0.0590
**
−0.0670*** −0.0155 −0.0197 −0.0075 −0.0094
(−2.09) (−3.21) (−0.72) (−1.38) (−0.45) (−0.68)
Term structuret + 0.0143
* 0.0116** −0.0024 −0.0026 −0.0065 −0.0077
(1.66) (2.02) (−0.48) (−0.88) (−0.89) (−1.15)
Effective tax ratet + 0.0710
*
−0.0103 −0.0148 −0.0042 −0.0458*** −0.0202
(1.85) (−0.27) (−1.01) (−0.37) (−2.67) (−1.40)
Sizet + 0.0682
*** 0.0415* 0.0786*** 0.0523* 0.0779*** 0.0696***
(16.07) (1.79) (16.98) (1.91) (23.31) (4.14)
Constant −0.8306*** −0.3530 −1.2532*** −0.6213 −0.7088*** −0.5562***
(−12.46) (−0.98) (−13.41) (−1.08) (−15.6) (−2.65)
Observations 2,423 2,423 1,886 1,886 2,946 2,946
R2 0.1542 0.0272 0.2042 0.0176 0.2009 0.0300
Note: The dependent variable is debt maturity, measured by long-term debt that matures after 1 year divided by total debt. Leverage is measured by total debt
divided by the market value of equity plus total liabilities. Cash holdings are the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets. Growth opportunities
are measured by market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities, all divided by total assets. Asset maturity structure is measured by net property, plant
and equipment divided by depreciation. Earnings volatility is the standard deviation of EBITD over the 3 years preceding the sample year, scaled by average
total assets for that period. Firm quality is the difference between EPS in years t + 1 and t to share price in year t. Term structure is the difference between
yields on 10Y government bonds and 3M treasury bills. Effective tax rate is measured by income taxes divided by pre-tax income. Size is the natural logarithm of
total assets in 2005 price. t-Statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively.
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The results for the interaction term between growth
opportunities and debt maturity are mixed. The coeffi-
cient on the interaction term is negative and significant
in the pooled OLS regressions of Thai and Singaporean
firms. As discussed earlier, the significantly negative coef-
ficient provides a support for the hypothesis that short
debt maturity reduces the negative impact of growth
opportunities on leverage (the substitution effect). For
example, when considering the total impact of growth
opportunities on leverage for firms in Thailand, firms
that use more short-term debt have a smaller total nega-
tive impact of growth opportunities on leverage (∂LEV/
∂GTH = −0.0797 to 0.0257MAT).
However, the result also suggests that even with 100%
short-term debt (MAT = 0), growth opportunities still
negatively affect leverage. This means that short debt
maturity cannot completely substitute for low leverage in
controlling the underinvestment problem and implies
that using short debt maturity has costs, which also force
firms to simultaneously reduce leverage. Under liquidity
risk theory, these costs are liquidity risk costs.
Furthermore, when considering the total impact of
debt maturity on leverage (∂LEV/∂MAT = 0.0829–
0.0257GTH), the total positive impact of debt maturity on
leverage becomes weaker when firms have higher growth
opportunities. With the level of growth opportunities at























−0.1148*** −0.1378*** −0.0967*** −0.2969*** −0.2580***
(−18.13) (−6.37) (−12.71) (−5.40) (−24.23) (−9.37)
Debt maturityt +/− 0.0292
*** 0.0312*** 0.0270*** 0.0304*** 0.0323*** 0.0347***
(Prop. long) (5.14) (3.23) (4.33) (3.09) (4.36) (3.06)






































Dividend dummyt − −0.0082
** 0.0026 0.0420*** 0.0041 0.0024 0.0034
(−2.22) (0.63) (9.03) (0.74) (0.49) (0.60)
Net debt issuancet + 0.0227 0.0090 0.0298 0.0295 0.0863
*** 0.0246
(0.93) (0.44) (1.19) (1.42) (3.29) (0.88)
Profitabilityt − 0.0788
*** 0.0649** 0.2117*** 0.2318*** 0.0345 0.0113
(2.90) (2.22) (6.78) (5.86) (1.24) (0.36)
Sizet − 0.0021
* 0.0072 0.0044*** 0.0019 −0.0116*** −0.0128*
(1.67) (0.91) (2.96) (0.33) (−7.78) (−1.76)
Constant 0.0928*** −0.0300 0.0180 0.0682 0.3843*** 0.3835***
(5.02) (−0.24) (0.59) (0.56) (19.87) (4.43)
Observations 2,423 2,423 1,886 1,886 2,946 2,946
R2 0.2253 0.1427 0.2628 0.1061 0.2380 0.1390
Note: The dependent variable is cash holdings, measured by the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets. Leverage is measured by total debt
divided by the market value of equity plus total liabilities. Debt maturity is measured by long-term debt that matures after 1 year divided by total debt. Growth
opportunities are measured by market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities, all divided by total assets. Net working capital is measured by net
working capital net of cash holdings, all divided by total assets. CAPEX is measured by capital expenditures divided by total assets. Dividend dummy is 1 if a
firm paid a common dividend in a given year, 0 otherwise. Net debt issuance is measured by long-term borrowings minus long-term debt reduction, all divided
by total assets. Profitability is the ratio of operating income to total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets in 2006 price. t-Statistics based on robust
standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively.
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TABLE 7 Joint determination of leverage, debt maturity and cash holdings
Independent variable
Two-equation system Three-equation system






















*** 0.0167 −0.0778*** 0.0179 0.0021
(−4.36) (0.95) (−4.57) (1.03) (0.47)





















*** 0.0341*** 0.0154*** 0.0306*** −0.0007
(3.58) (4.13) (3.79) (3.81) (−0.33)
Asset maturity structuret 0.0006 0.0008
(1.33) (1.59)
Earnings volatilityt −0.0959 −0.0577
(−0.62) (−0.37)





Effective tax ratet 0.0324 0.0419
(0.88) (1.19)
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TABLE 7 (Continued)
Independent variable
Two-equation system Three-equation system
Leverage Debt maturity Leverage Debt maturity Cash holdings
Net debt issuancet 0.0078
(0.30)
Observations 2,172 2,172 2,172 2,172 2,172
AR(1) test −8.00*** −7.72*** −8.47*** −7.68*** −5.87***
AR(2) test −0.52 0.42 −0.42 0.37 0.30




Debt maturityt-1 0.7731*** 0.7661***
(Prop. long) (11.25) (11.19)
Cash holdingst-1 0.5897***
(9.52)
Leveraget 0.2108 −0.0161 −0.0618**
(1.31) (−0.11) (−2.29)
Debt maturityt −0.1191** −0.1286** 0.0208
(Prop. long) (−1.97) (−2.22) (1.24)
Cash holdingst −0.1861* 0.1929
(−1.82) (1.04)
Growth opportunitiest −0.0781*** 0.0273 −0.0835*** −0.0032 −0.0038













Profitabilityt −0.2652*** −0.2267*** 0.1196***
(−3.26) (−2.69) (3.30)
Non-debt tax shieldst 0.4823 0.5702**
(1.62) (2.13)
Sizet 0.0166*** 0.0171** 0.0202*** 0.0189** 0.0014
(3.15) (2.28) (3.98) (2.44) (0.65)
Asset maturity structuret 0.0006*** 0.0006***
(3.68) (3.30)
Earnings volatilityt 0.1905 0.2812
(1.11) (1.65)
Firm qualityt −0.0264 −0.0253
(−1.29) (−1.06)
Term structuret −0.0005 −0.0021
(−0.13) (−0.49)
Effective tax ratet 0.0060 0.0043
(0.63) (0.38)
(Continues)
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TABLE 7 (Continued)
Independent variable
Two-equation system Three-equation system
Leverage Debt maturity Leverage Debt maturity Cash holdings






Net debt issuancet 0.0380
(1.54)
Observations 1,680 1,680 1,680 1,680 1,680
AR(1) test −5.71*** −7.05*** −5.64*** −7.15*** −5.79***
AR(2) test −0.27 1.73* −0.37 1.92* 0.30
AR(3) test - 0.38 - 0.19 -











Leveraget −0.0586 −0.0059 −0.1765
**
(−0.48) (−0.05) (−5.00)
Debt maturityt −0.0503 −0.0391 0.0228





*** 0.0301* −0.0662*** 0.0341** −0.0075
(−4.84) (1.92) (−5.53) (2.13) (−1.16)





















*** 0.0466*** 0.0091** 0.0469*** −0.0052*
(2.99) (7.89) (2.23) (8.29) (−1.94)
Asset maturity structuret 0.0004
*** 0.0004***
(3.33) (2.93)
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its mean (1.284), the total impact of debt maturity on
leverage is positive (the complementary effect). However,
with the maximum level of growth opportunities (4.705),
the total impact of debt maturity on leverage becomes
negative (the substitution effect). This means that for
high-growth firms, the underinvestment problem is more
severe, consistent with the prediction of Myers' (1977)
underinvestment hypothesis. Similar results are also
found in Singaporean firms. In sum, the above results
suggest that in Thailand and Singapore, debt maturity
is used as a strategic complement to leverage in reduc-
ing liquidity risk when firms have normal growth but
when those firms have extremely high growth, the
underinvestment problem may outweigh the liquidity
risk problem.
4.2.2 | Debt maturity equation
Table 5 reports the result of the debt maturity model
using the pooled OLS regressions. The result shows a
significant and positive effect of leverage on debt matu-
rity (proportion of long-term debt) in all countries, and
provides further evidence that leverage and debt maturity
are used as strategic complements in reducing liquidity
risk. Firms with high leverage lengthen their debt matu-
rity to mitigate the liquidity risk. This finding is consis-
tent with Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Brick and
Liao (2016).
Consistent with Brick and Liao (2016), cash hold-
ings have a significant and positive impact on debt
maturity in all countries, suggesting that larger cash
holdings result in firms increasing their debt maturity.
Acharya et al. (2007) find that constrained firms tend
to save cash in growth environments if their hedging
needs are high. This relationship can also be explained
by the notion that firms may simultaneously borrow
long-term debt and hold a stock of cash to hedge uncer-
tain future financing conditions (Sun, 2014). Liquidity
risk can be exasperated if the level of cash holding does
not meet the current liabilities of the business. Thus
Yan, Hall, and Turner (2014) advocate for a liquidity
TABLE 7 (Continued)
Independent variable
Two-equation system Three-equation system
Leverage Debt maturity Leverage Debt maturity Cash holdings





Term structuret −0.0016 −0.0019
(−0.28) (−0.35)
Effective tax ratet −0.0170 −0.0086
(−1.03) (−0.59)








Net debt issuancet 0.0403
(1.33)
Observations 2,626 2,626 2,626 2,626 2,626
AR(1) test −8.73*** −8.65*** −8.42*** −8.66*** −8.23***
AR(2) test −0.92 −0.72 1.12 −0.66 −0.08
Hansen test (df ) 162.31(84)*** 86.27(84) 191.35(112)*** 105.08(112) 95.11(84)
Note: The structural equations are estimated by two-step system GMM estimator with robust standard errors. For definition of variables, see Table A1. t-
Statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. AR(1) and AR(2) tests are tests for first-order and second-
order serial correlation in residuals, respectively, under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen test is the test of over-identifying restrictions under the null of
valid instruments.
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risk management through the provision of additional
risk exposure information.
Surprisingly, the result shows that debt maturity sta-
tistically increases with growth opportunities for Thai
and Singaporean firms. Although it is consistent with the
empirical result found by Stohs and Mauer (1996) and
Elyasiani et al. (2002) for the U.S. firms, it contradicts
Myers' (1977) prediction that high-growth firms shorten
their debt maturity to reduce the underinvestment incen-
tive. However, this positive relationship between debt
maturity and growth opportunities can be justified by the
theoretical prediction of Hart and Moore (1994). Hart
and Moore argue that firms with long-term growth
opportunities use long-term debt to control the over-
investment problem as long-term debt reduces firms'
capability to increase funds for future investments. More-
over, the insignificant impact of growth opportunities on
debt maturity indicates that there is no economic rela-
tionship between debt maturity and growth opportuni-
ties. This insignificant impact of growth opportunities on
debt maturity implies that firms in these countries use
only a low-leverage strategy as a tool to reduce the under-
investment problem.
Furthermore, consistent with Dang (2011), the statis-
tically insignificant coefficient on the interaction term
between growth opportunities and leverage in all coun-
tries suggests that the overall positive effect of leverage
on debt maturity is unaffected by the level of growth
opportunities. Debt maturity increases with leverage
irrespective of growth opportunities. This supports liquid-
ity risk theory.
4.2.3 | Cash holdings equation
Table 6 is the result of the cash holdings model and indi-
cates that leverage and debt maturity (proportion of long-
term debt) are key determinants of cash holdings across
the countries as expected. The signs of the relationship
between cash holdings and leverage and between cash
holdings and debt maturity are consistent with those in
the leverage and debt maturity equations.
This result is in line with Opler et al. (1999), Guney,
Ozkan, and Ozkan (2007), Bates et al. (2009) and Brick
and Liao (2016). One plausible explanation is a substitu-
tion effect, which states that firms use borrowings as a
substitute for cash holdings. Another explanation is the
overinvestment hypothesis. Debt payments reduce firms'
ability to accumulate cash. Consequently, firms with
higher leverage may have less cash balances.
The significant positive coefficient on debt maturity
suggests that the level of cash holdings increases with the
maturity of debt. Although this contradicts the argument
of Harford et al. (2014) that firms with shorter debt matu-
rity may hold larger cash balances to reduce refinancing
risk, Sun (2014) argues that firms may simultaneously
borrow long-term debt and hold a stock of cash when
they expect to face uncertain future financing conditions.
This finding is consistent with Brick and Liao (2016).
Growth opportunities are positively related to cash
holdings only in the FE (within) regression for Thai
firms. As previously discussed, high-growth firms may
hold large cash balances to (a) avoid passing up valuable
investment opportunities, (b) avoid expensive external
funding (Myers & Majluf, 1984; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004) or
(c) minimize their financial distress costs (Ferreira &
Vilela, 2004; Myers, 1984). As for Indonesian and Singa-
porean firms, growth opportunities appear to have a neg-
ative but insignificant effect on cash holdings. According
to the overinvestment hypothesis, firms with poor growth
opportunities may accumulate more cash reserves to
have sufficient funds to invest in future projects, even if
these projects are not profitable (Bates et al., 2009;
Ferreira & Vilela, 2004).
4.2.4 | Joint determination of leverage,
debt maturity and cash holdings
Table 7 shows the result of the joint determination of
leverage, debt maturity and cash holdings. The first two
columns report the estimation of a system of equations
for leverage and debt maturity. The next three columns
report the estimation of a system of leverage, debt matu-
rity and cash holdings equations. In each equation, lever-
age, debt maturity, cash holdings and their first-lagged
levels are treated as endogenous. The last rows indicate
the specification tests that assess the conditions required
for the GMM estimator to yield consistent estimates. In
all equations, as expected, the Arellano-Bond test for
first-order serial correlation in first differences is signifi-
cant, while the test for second-order serial correlation in
first differences is insignificant with the exception of
Indonesia. This means that there is no serial correlation
in the error term in the level equations and the second
lagged level of the endogenous variables can be used as
an instrument in the regressions of Thai and Singaporean
firms. As for Indonesian firms, the third lagged level is
employed. Moreover, we follow the rule of thumb to keep
the number of instruments less than the number of firms
as Roodman (2009) argues that too many instruments
can over fit the endogenous variables and weaken the
Hansen test. Hence, only the second- (or third- for Indo-
nesian firms) to fourth-lagged levels of the endogenous
variables are used as instruments. However, the Hansen
test of over-identifying restrictions for the leverage
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equation in all countries is rejected, meaning that those
results may suffer from the over identification problem
and should be interpreted with caution.
The results show that firms in all countries have tar-
get levels for leverage, debt maturity and cash holdings as
the coefficients on the lagged dependent variables are sta-
tistically at the 1% level. For Thai firms, as the magnitude
of the coefficient on the lagged leverage variable that
reflects the adjustment cost ranges between
0.5903–0.6002, the estimated speed of adjustment
towards target leverage is 40%. This means that Thai
firms can make full adjustment towards their target
leverage in 2.5 years (1/0.40). However, Indonesian and
Singaporean firm have the higher estimated speeds of
adjustment towards target leverage (47 and 54% in the
three-equation systems, respectively).
In the leverage equation, the results show that when
cash holdings are added as an endogenous variable in the
three-equation system, the magnitudes of the coefficients
slightly change, but their significance levels and signs
remain the same in all countries, except for tangibility
that loses its significance. However, when addressing the
endogeneity among leverage, debt maturity and cash
holdings, the sign of coefficient on debt maturity in both
the two-equation and three-equation systems (negative
sign) reverses, compared to that in the single equation
(positive sign). The negative relationship between lever-
age and debt maturity (the proportion of long-term debt)
suggests that debt maturity is used as a substitute for
leverage to control the underinvestment problem. This is
consistent with Billett et al. (2007) and with Myers' (1977)
underinvestment hypothesis that firms lower leverage or
TABLE 8 Determinants of firm investment
Independent variable Predicted sign Thailand Indonesia Singapore







Debt maturityt-1 − −0.2705
***
−0.0669 −0.0426
(Prop. long) (−2.69) (−1.15) (−0.41)
Cash holdingst-1 + 0.3914 0.2583
* 0.0629
(1.60) (1.72) (0.41)






















Constant 0.1625*** 0.0738 0.0577
(2.91) (1.31) (1.10)
Observations 2,172 1,680 2,624
AR(1) test −4.87*** −4.75*** −5.73***
AR(2) test 1.68* −0.08 0.40
AR(3) test −1.21 − −
Hansen test (df ) 118.05(114) 188.04(168) 166.42(168)
Note: The dependent variable is firm investment, measured by capital expenditures less depreciation, all divided by lagged net property, plant and equipment.
Leverage is measured by total debt divided by the market value of equity plus total liabilities. Debt maturity is measured by long-term debt that matures after
1 year divided by total debt. Cash holdings are measured by the ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets. Growth opportunities are measured by
market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities, all divided by total assets. Cash flow is measured by EBITDA divided by total assets. t-Statistics are in
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests are tests for first-order, second-order and third-
order serial correlation in residuals, respectively, under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen test is the test of over-identifying restrictions under the null of
valid instruments.
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shorten debt maturity to reduce the underinvestment
incentive. Nevertheless, there is no statistically negative
relationship between leverage and debt maturity in
Singaporean firms.
The coefficients on cash holding and growth opportuni-
ties are still significant at the 1% level and have negative
signs in all countries, same as the single-equation results.
These findings are similar to the results of existing studies
on cash holdings (Brick & Liao, 2016) and growth opportu-
nities (Barclay et al., 2003; Billett et al., 2007; Dang, 2011;
Elyasiani et al., 2002; Johnson, 2003; Li et al., 2020). How-
ever, in contrast to the single-equation result, the coefficient
on the interaction term between growth opportunities and
debt maturity (the proportion of long-term debt) in all
countries exhibits the positive sign. This finding is in line
with Billett et al. (2007). The significant positive coefficient
on the interaction term contradicts the prediction of the
underinvestment hypothesis that the coefficient on the
interaction term is expected to be negative, as discussed ear-
lier. The significant positive coefficient on the interaction
however implies that high-growth firms in all countries
may also face liquidity risk because the effect of debt matu-
rity on leverage can turn from negative to positive when
growth opportunities increase (Thailand: ∂LEV/∂MAT = −
0.1131 + 0.0749GTH, Indonesia: ∂LEV/∂MAT = − 0.1286
+ 0.0602GTH and Singapore: ∂LEV/∂MAT = +
0.0506GTH). This supports liquidity risk theory as high-
growth firms not only shorten debt maturity to reduce the
underinvestment incentive, but also decrease leverage to
reduce liquidity risk. The sign and significance of the coeffi-
cients on the other control variables are generally consistent
with the single-equation results.
As for the debt maturity equation, when adding cash
holdings as an endogenous variable in the three-equation
system, the results are generally consistent with those in
the two-equation system in all countries. Furthermore,
when addressing the endogeneity problem, the results from
two-equation and three-equation systems are similar to
those in the FE (within) regression. Consistent with John-
son (2003) and Billett et al. (2007), the debt maturity equa-
tion appears less well behaved than the leverage equation.
Leverage is not statistically significant in all countries. This
insignificant impact of leverage opposes our postulate that
leverage is a key determinant of debt maturity. However,
Antoniou, Guney, and Paudyal (2006) find that leverage is
statistically insignificant for French and German firms in
their dynamic debt maturity model estimated by the two-
step system GMM. Similarly, Pour and Khansalar (2015)
also report this insignificance of leverage for a pooled sam-
ple of firms in 24 OECD countries in their dynamic debt
maturity model estimated by the two-step system GMM.
The estimates of cash holdings in all countries are either
insignificant or weakly significant. The coefficient on growth
opportunities is insignificant in Thai and Indonesian firms,
while it is positively significant in Singaporean firms. The
insignificant effect of growth opportunities on debt maturity
is in line with Antoniou et al. (2006), Terra (2009) and
Dang (2011). The insignificant coefficient on the interaction
term is also in line with Dang (2011). As for the other vari-
ables, the results are in line with the single-equation analysis.
The results for the cash holdings equation show that
after accounting for the endogeneity problem, debt matu-
rity loses its significance while a significant and negative
relationship between leverage and cash holdings still
holds in all countries. The significance and sign of the
coefficients on leverage and debt maturity are consistent
with those in the leverage and debt maturity equations in
the single equation system. The negative relationship
indicates that firms with high leverage may use borrow-
ings as a substitute for cash holdings. The finding is in
line with Ozkan and Ozkan (2004), and Brick and
Liao (2016). This is also consistent with the pecking order
theory, which states that firms exhaust their internal cash
prior to opting for debt followed by equity funding.
Hence in a high growth environment with many positive
NPV projects firms would be likely to exhaust their cash
reserves and raise more leverage. The insignificant coeffi-
cient on debt maturity can be interpreted as debt matu-
rity not being important to firms' policy on cash holdings.
This finding is also reported by Ferreira and Vilela (2004),
and it is consistent with Al-Najjar and Belghitar (2011)
and Kim, Seo, and Sohn (2011), where they find that the
coefficient on growth opportunities is insignificant. This
does not support the views that firms with high growth
opportunities accumulate cash to avoid passing up invest-
ment opportunities or expensive external funding or to
reduce their financial distress costs. The results for the
other variables are consistent with the single-equation
results.
The overall findings from the analysis of the dynamic
models show that the sign and significance of the coeffi-
cients on leverage, debt maturity, cash holdings and
growth opportunities may be inconsistent with those
reported in the single-equation analysis. This inconsis-
tency highlights the importance of accounting for the
joint determination of leverage, debt maturity and cash
holdings when assessing the relationships among these
financial policy variables and firm characteristics.
4.2.5 | Effect of growth opportunities
and corporate financial policy on firm
investment
Table 8 is the result of the firm investment, leverage, debt
maturity, cash holdings. The two interaction terms
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(growth opportunities*debt maturity, and growth
opportunities*leverage) are treated as endogenous vari-
ables. In the case of Thai firms, the AR(2) test is rejected
at the 10% level. This means that there is serial correla-
tion in the error term in the level equations and the sec-
ond lagged level of the endogenous variables cannot be
used as an instrument in the regression of Thai firms.
Therefore, the third and fourth lags are used as instru-
ments. The Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions
for the leverage equation is not rejected, meaning that
there is no the over identification problem.
In all countries, the lagged investment is positive and
significant at the 1% level. This supports the view that
future investments can determine the past investments.
However, the results for the other variables are mixed.
The results for Thai firms are broadly consistent with the
previous empirical findings (Aivazian, Ge, & Qiu, 2005a,
2005b and Lang, Ofek, & Stulz, 1996), except for lagged
growth opportunities. The coefficients on lagged leverage
and lagged debt maturity are negative and significant at
the 1% level. These two results support Myers' (1977)
underinvestment hypothesis that firms lower leverage or
shorten debt maturity to reduce the underinvestment
incentive. The insignificant coefficient on lagged cash
holdings is consistent with the result in the cash holding
equation, which suggests that firms with high growth
opportunities may not accumulate cash to avoid passing
up investment opportunities. Although the negative
impact of lagged growth opportunities contradict the
view that firms with high growth opportunities should
have high investments, this finding is in line with the
argument that firms with high growth opportunities may
face the underinvestment problem.
In the case of Indonesia, the coefficients on lagged
leverage, lagged debt maturity and lagged growth oppor-
tunities are negative but insignificant while the coeffi-
cients on lagged cash holdings and lagged cash flow are
significantly positive. This means that leverage, debt
maturity and growth opportunities do not affect the
investment decision in Indonesian firms. However, cash
policy is important to the investment decision as the coef-
ficients on cash holdings and cash flow are significantly
positive as expected. The insignificant effects of the two
interaction terms are in line with the results for leverage,
debt maturity and growth opportunities.
As for Singapore, the results show that leverage
affects the investment decision in Singaporean firms
(∂INVt-1/∂LEVt-1 = − 0.3703 + 0.2559GTHt-1). The result
supports the underinvestment hypothesis that firms
lower leverage to reduce the underinvestment incentive.
Moreover, the indirect positive impact of growth opportu-
nities in the interaction term is consistent with the view
that growth opportunities induce more investments.
However, cash policy does not appear to be significant to
the investment decision as the coefficients on cash hold-
ings and cash flow are insignificant.
4.2.6 | Robustness tests
Additional robustness tests of the empirical findings in
this study are conducted by using alternative measures of
cash holdings. In the above empirical analysis, cash hold-
ings are measured by the ratio of cash and short-term
investments to total assets. This measure is the traditional
measure of cash holdings that is widely used in literature.
In the robustness tests, the ratio of cash and short-term
investments to net sales are employed. Tables A2 and A3
in the appendix, the ratio of cash and short-term invest-
ments to net sales is used to re-estimate the equations.
The results show that the estimates of the relationships
among growth opportunities, leverage, debt maturity,
cash holdings and firm investment are qualitatively simi-
lar to those obtained from the traditional measure,
suggesting that the estimated relationships are robust to
the choice of a cash holdings measure.
5 | CONCLUSION
This study investigates the simultaneous relationships
among leverage, debt maturity and cash holdings and
also explores how these jointly determined financial pol-
icy choices influence firms' investment activities ex-post
in three major AEC countries (Thailand, Indonesia and
Singapore) during the period from 2005 to 2014 using the
two-step system GMM estimator. Unlike previous studies
ours is the first to examine the simultaneous relation-
ships between firms leverage, debt maturity, cash hold-
ings and Investment in high growth environments. In
order to examine the potential interdependencies among
leverage, debt maturity and cash holdings, three types of
models are employed: a single-equation model that does
not consider the endogeneity among leverage, debt matu-
rity and cash holdings; a two-equation model that con-
siders the endogeneity between leverage and debt
maturity; and a three-equation model that considers the
endogeneity among leverage, debt maturity and cash
holdings.
The empirical results support several contributions.
First, the results highlight the importance of considering
the simultaneity of leverage, debt maturity and cash
holdings, suggesting that future research should not
ignore this endogeneity bias as it may lead to flawed con-
clusions. The overall findings from the analysis of the
two-equation and three-equation models show that the
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coefficients on leverage, debt maturity, cash holdings and
growth opportunities may be inconsistent with those
reported in the single-equation model.6
Second, we find support for both the underinvestment
hypothesis and liquidity risk theory. High-growth firms
not only shorten debt maturity to reduce the liquidity
risk, but also decrease leverage to mitigate the underin-
vestment incentive. Third, we find that cash holdings sig-
nificantly affect the decision on leverage in these
countries. This implies that firms value financial flexibil-
ity in high growth environments. However, there is no
support for the impact of cash holdings on debt maturity.
Finally, there is evidence that debt policy and growth
opportunities affect firms' investment decision in
Thailand and Singapore. However, cash policy is more
important in Indonesia.
Our findings have implications to capital market par-
ticipants and regulatory policy makers. From an investor
standpoint in the fund allocation decision our results aid
towards the formulation of effective benchmarks that can
assist in identifying abnormal return opportunities. Fur-
thermore, from a regulatory standpoint, as our work
sheds insight on the dynamics of how leverage, debt
maturity and cash holdings simultaneously effect each
other and the firm's investment policy our findings can
assist towards the better understanding of the economy
wide systematic risks at a macro level and hence shape
regulatory policy aimed at reducing the macroeconomic
risks in these high growth environments.
Our work also opens up few new and fruitful research
avenues. It would be interesting to study the simulta-
neous effect of a firms leverage, debt maturity, cash hold-
ings and investments on its financial flexibility as surveys
of Chief Financial Officers show that financial flexibility
is the dominant consideration when firms choose their
corporate capital structures (see Brounen, De Jong, &
Koedijk, 2004; Graham & Harvey, 2001). In the same
vein, a study of simultaneous effects of a firm's leverage,
debt maturity, cash holdings and investments on its divi-
dend policy in high growth environments can shed
important insights to investors. Furthermore, at a more
local level an investigation as to why debt policy and
growth opportunities affect firms' the investment decision
in Thailand and Singapore whilst the cash policy is more
important in Indonesia could shed insight into the struc-
tural differences between the nations that could have
important policy level implications.
ENDNOTES
1 For instance, Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and
Zingales (1995) and Frank and Goyal (2009) investigate the deter-
minants of capital structure. Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs
and Mauer (1996) examine the determinants of debt maturity
structure, while Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998) and Opler,
Pinkowitza, and Stulz (1999) explore the determinants of corpo-
rate cash holdings.
2 Expect data policy: The data that support the findings of this
study are openly available in Datastream and Worldscope data-
bases and are available on request by the authors.
3 Market frictions, such as transaction and adjustment costs, can
hinder firms from instantaneously adjusting their leverage, debt
maturity and cash holdings towards their targets following new
circumstances, leading to delays in the adjustment process.
4 Johnson (2003) and Dang (2011) report the mean (median) lever-
age of 0.21 (0.18) and 0.228 (0.189), respectively.
5 We have conducted a variance inflation test (VIF) on all variables
in our equations and find that the all VIF scores are below 7, well
below the established threshold of 10. VIF is essentially 1/(1-ri
2)
with ri
2 the determination coefficient of the prediction of all other
variables for the Ith variable; diagonal elements of R−1, with R−1
the inverse of the correlation matrix (VIF = 1 if orthogonal);
values >10 (ri
2 > 0.9) indicates variance over 10 times as large as
case of orthogonal predictors. See Seiler (2004).
6 However, the relationship between leverage and debt maturity
still hold after considering the endogeneity among leverage, debt
maturity and cash holding.
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APPENDIX A.
TABLE A1 Variable definitions
Variable Definition
Panel A: Leverage equation
Leverage Total debt divided by the market value of equity plus total liabilities
Growth opportunities
(Tobin's Q)
Market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities, all divided by total assets
Tangibility Ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets
Profitability Ratio of operating income to total assets
Non-debt tax shields Ratio of depreciation and amortisation to total assets
Size Natural logarithm of total assets in 2006 price
Panel B: Debt maturity equation
Debt maturity Long-term debt that matures after 1 year divided by total debt
Growth opportunities
(Tobin's Q)
Market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities, all divided by total assets
Asset maturity structure Net property, plant and equipment divided by depreciation
Size Natural logarithm of total assets in 2006 price




Difference between EPS in years t + 1 and t to share price in year t
Term structure Difference between yields on 10Y government bonds and 3M treasury bills
Effective tax rate Income taxes divided by pre-tax income
Panel C: Cash holdings equation
Cash holdings Ratio of cash and short-term investments to total assets
Growth opportunities
(Tobin's Q)
Market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities, all divided by total assets
Net working capital Net working capital net of cash holdings, all divided by total assets
Size Natural logarithm of total assets in 2006 price
CAPEX Capital expenditures divided by total assets
Dividend dummy 1 if a firm paid a common dividend in a given year, 0 otherwise
Net debt issuance Long-term borrowings minus long-term debt reduction, all divided by total assets
Profitability Ratio of operating income to total assets
Panel D: Firm investment equation
Firm investment Capital expenditures less depreciation, all divided by lagged net property, plant and equipment
Growth opportunities
(Tobin's Q)
Market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities, all divided by total assets
Cash flow EBITDA divided by total assets
Note: As for Singapore, term structure is the difference between the yields of 10-year government bonds and those of 1-year treasury bills since their final
3-month and 6-month treasury bills had been discontinued since 2013, and the yields of 1-year treasury bills are almost identical to those of 3-month treasury
bills, as shown in Table A2.
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(Prop. long) (10.97) (10.93) (12.15)
Cash holdingst-1 0.5358
*** 0.4893*** 0.5658***
(Net sales) (7.47) (6.13) (9.70)
Leveraget 0.0747 −0.1528
*** 0.1727 −0.2893*** 0.0098 −0.4142***
(0.60) (−2.86) (1.01) (−2.76) (0.08) (−3.75)
Debt maturityt −0.1043
* 0.0933* −0.1113** 0.1044** −0.0128 0.0923
(Prop. long) (−1.70) (1.87) (−2.25) (2.32) (−0.26) (1.22)
Cash holdingst −0.0570
** 0.1359** −0.0551* 0.0647 −0.0188 0.0484*
(Net sales) (−2.20) (2.38) (−1.87) (1.29) (1.58) (1.75)
Growth
opportunitiest
−0.0763*** 0.0262 −0.0013 −0.0791*** 0.0246 −0.0249* −0.0639*** 0.0353** −0.0263





















−0.1043* −0.3063*** −0.1000 −0.1721*** −0.1404*
(−5.33) (−1.92) (−3.90) (−1.17) (−4.65) (−1.87)




*** 0.0328*** −0.0019 0.0191*** 0.0188** 0.0139** 0.0121*** 0.0441*** 0.0160







Earnings volatilityt −0.0857 0.1983 0.0847
(−0.57) (1.81) (0.93)






Effective tax ratet 0.0454 0.0095 −0.0073
(1.33) (0.74) (−0.48)





























Net debt issuancet 0.0482 0.2094
*** 0.1588*
(0.67) (2.67) (1.75)
Observations 2,172 2,172 2,172 1,680 1,680 1,680 2,626 2,626 2,626
AR(1) test −8.35*** −7.74*** −2.70*** −5.76*** −7.15*** −3.52*** −8.49*** −8.71*** −3.83***
AR(2) test −0.38 0.25 1.11 −0.36 1.76* 1.25 0.70 −0.69 1.29





















Note: Cash holdings are measured by the ratio of cash and short-term investments to net sales. The structural equations are estimated by two-step system GMM
estimator with robust standard errors. For definition of variables, see Table A1. t-Statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and
1% levels, respectively. AR(1), AR(2), AR(3) tests are tests for first-order, second-order and third-order serial correlation in residuals, respectively, under the
null of no serial correlation. Hansen test is the test of over-identifying restrictions under the null of valid instruments.
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TABLE A3 Robustness of determinants of firm investment
Independent variable Predicted sign Thailand Indonesia Singapore







Debt maturityt-1 − −0.2517
**
−0.0540 −0.0715
(Prop. long) (−2.38) (−1.00) (−0.70)
Cash holdingst-1 + 0.0879 0.0550 −0.0158
(net sales) (0.92) (1.55) (−0.67)
Growth opportunitiest-1 + −0.0894
* 0.0057 −0.0067
(−2.88) (0.20) (−0.17)


















Constant 0.1688*** 0.0702 0.1042**
(3.01) (1.46) (2.17)
Observations 2,172 1,680 2,624
AR(1) test −4.69*** −4.71*** −5.72***
AR(2) test 1.53 −0.08 0.43
AR(3) test −1.19 − −
Hansen test (df ) 127.05 (114) 180.54 (168) 172.85 (168)
Note: The dependent variable is firm investment, measured by capital expenditures less depreciation, all divided by lagged net property, plant and equipment.
Leverage is measured by total debt divided by the market value of equity plus total liabilities. Debt maturity is measured by long-term debt that matures after
1 year divided by total debt. Cash holdings are measured by the ratio of cash and short-term investments to net sales. Growth opportunities are measured by
market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities, all divided by total assets. Cash flow is measured by EBITDA divided by total assets. t-Statistics are in
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) tests are tests for first-order, second-order, and third-
order serial correlation in residuals, respectively, under the null of no serial correlation. Hansen test is the test of over-identifying restrictions under the null of
valid instruments.
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